Deployment runbook
The operator's document: how to stand this repository up in an organization, how to ship a release, how to deploy the website, and what to do when something goes wrong.
Work top to bottom the first time. After that, jump to Routine operations or Rollback.
Ownership. One named person owns this runbook and ticks the boxes. Owners are listed in ../governance/teams.yaml. If nobody owns it, it is not a control.
Evidence rule. A step is complete when there is a command output, a run link, or a screenshot recorded in the phase record — not when the setting looked right. Every phase ends with an Evidence line for exactly that reason.
Phase 0 — Preflight
Goal: know what you have before you change it. Owner: engineering lead. Time: 30 minutes.
0.1 Confirm the plan
SSO, SCIM, enterprise AI controls and audit streaming exist only on GitHub Enterprise Cloud. On Free or Team those toggles either do not appear or do nothing.
gh api orgs/<org> --jq '{plan: .plan.name, seats: .plan.filled_seats}'
If the answer is free or team, read ../governance/org.json .plan_requirements before promising anyone a control you cannot enable. A trial is available from the org's billing page.
0.2 Name the owners
Two or three, one of them the engineering lead. Owners can change everything, so the list stays short. Record them in teams.yaml → owners.
gh api orgs/<org>/members?role=admin --jq '.[].login'
0.3 Prepare the operator machine
gh auth status # authenticated, with admin:org
gh auth refresh -s admin:org,repo,read:org # add scopes if needed
command -v jq node npm # all required
npm ci && npm --prefix archify ci # repository test dependencies
0.4 Pin the action SHAs
The security workflows ship with readable versions and a PIN-TODO marker. CI fails until they are pinned (security / action pins).
enterprise/governance/pin-actions.sh --dry-run
enterprise/governance/pin-actions.sh
git diff --stat .github/workflows
0.5 Take a baseline
enterprise/governance/verify.sh --org <org> --repo <org>/archify --report baseline.md || true
Keep baseline.md. It is what "drift" is measured against on day 30.
Evidence: plan name, owner list, baseline.md, pinned-SHA diff.
Phase 1 — Foundation
Goal: lock the doors before anyone moves in. Owner: security lead. Time: 45 minutes.
1.1 Apply the org settings
enterprise/governance/apply.sh --org <org> --scope org --dry-run # read the requests
enterprise/governance/apply.sh --org <org> --scope org
This sets: default repository permission none, private-repo creation only, forking of private repositories off, member-created Pages off, mandatory 2FA, sign-off on web commits, and scanning defaults for new repositories.
1.2 Warn people before 2FA is enforced
Anyone without 2FA is removed from the org when the setting turns on. Announce it a few days ahead, then confirm:
gh api orgs/<org> --jq .two_factor_requirement_enabled # true
1.3 UI-only member privileges
These are in org.json → .manual because the REST API does not expose them on every plan. Do them by hand: Org Settings → Member privileges.
- [ ] Members cannot delete repositories
- [ ] Members cannot transfer repositories
- [ ] Members cannot change repository visibility
- [ ] Members cannot invite outside collaborators
- [ ] Repository creation: private only
- [ ] Forking of private repositories: off
1.4 Verified domain and profile
- [ ] Add the company domain under Settings → Verified and approved domains
- [ ] Org profile has a description and a security contact address
Verify:
enterprise/governance/verify.sh --org <org> --repo <org>/archify | sed -n '/Organization/,/Team access/p'
Rollback: re-run apply.sh with the previous org.json, or set the two or three changed fields by hand. Nothing in this phase is destructive.
Evidence: verify.sh output for the Organization section, screenshot of Member privileges, domain verification badge.
Phase 2 — Teams and repository standards
Goal: access flows through teams, never through individual people. Owner: platform lead. Time: 30 minutes.
2.1 Create the teams
enterprise/governance/apply.sh --org <org> --scope org
Creates org-admins, engineering (parent), platform, security, ai-agents, then sets each team's permission on this repository:
| Team | Permission on archify | Holds |
|---|---|---|
org-admins | admin | 2–3 owners |
engineering | read | everyone in engineering, via sub-teams |
platform | maintain | CI, deploys, environment approvals |
security | write | alert triage, security review — write, because approval requires write |
ai-agents | write | no people — GitHub App installations only |
Role semantics, personas and the traps that cost an afternoon each: team-access.md. The one line to remember: a read member can comment on a pull request but their approval does not satisfy the ruleset.
2.2 Add people to teams, not repositories
gh api -X PUT orgs/<org>/teams/<slug>/memberships/<login> -f role=member
Never add a person to a repository directly. When they leave a team, their access to every repository that team can see disappears with it.
2.3 Repository standards
- [ ] Default visibility for new repositories: private (Settings → Repository)
- [ ]
.githubrepository holdsCONTRIBUTING.md,SECURITY.mdand PR templates - [ ]
template-serviceexists with README,.gitignore,LICENSE,CODEOWNERS, and is marked as a template - [ ] Naming pattern agreed:
team-product-purpose(backend-billing-api)
Verify:
gh api orgs/<org>/teams --jq '.[].slug'
gh api orgs/<org>/teams/ai-agents/repos/<org>/<repo> --jq .permission # write
gh api orgs/<org>/teams/ai-agents/members --jq 'length' # 0
Rollback: delete a team with gh api -X DELETE orgs/<org>/teams/<slug>. Doing so removes its access, so check nothing depends on it first.
Evidence: team list, ai-agents permission and empty member list.
Phase 3 — Protect the main branch
Goal: nothing reaches main without a pull request and a human approval. Owner: platform lead. Time: 30 minutes. Do not skip.
3.0 The ordering constraint
Apply this phase after ci.yml and security.yml have run at least once on the default branch. A required context that has never reported leaves every pull request pending forever.
# Has CI run on main yet?
gh run list --branch main --limit 5
# Which check names actually exist?
gh api "repos/<org>/<repo>/commits/main/check-runs?per_page=100" --jq '[.check_runs[].name] | unique'
Compare that list with required_status_checks in ../governance/rulesets/protect-main.json. If a context is missing, fix the job name in the workflow or remove the context from the file. Do not remove it to "get unblocked" without recording why.
3.1 Apply the rulesets
enterprise/governance/apply.sh --org <org> --scope org
enterprise/governance/apply.sh --org <org> --scope org --verify-checks
protect-main gives you:
- Restrict deletions, block force pushes
- Pull request required, 1 approval, stale approvals dismissed
- Review from Code Owners, and approval of the most recent push by someone else
- Required status checks, branch must be up to date
- Conversation resolution required
- CodeQL must report no high-or-higher alert
- Bypass:
OrganizationAdminonly — never an agent, bot or repository role
protect-release-tags makes v* tags immutable and restricts creation to org admins, because a moved tag is a forged release.
3.2 Raise the approval count where it matters
Payment, auth and infra repositories get 2 approvals. For this repository, 1 is the floor; raise required_approving_review_count in protect-main.json and re-apply if the risk changes.
3.3 CODEOWNERS
.github/CODEOWNERS already names the owner for .github/** and enterprise/**. Those paths cannot be changed without a Code Owner's approval, which is how path-level write restriction is expressed — GitHub rulesets cannot match file paths.
Verify:
enterprise/governance/verify.sh --org <org> --repo <org>/archify | sed -n '/Rulesets/,/Environments/p'
Rollback: set enforcement to disabled in the ruleset JSON and re-apply, or delete the ruleset in the UI. evaluate (log-only) is a GitHub Enterprise feature and does not exist on Team. Do not remove the bypass actor as a "fix" — that is the control.
Evidence: verify.sh Rulesets section showing active and the exact context list, plus one real pull request that was blocked by the ruleset.
Phase 4 — Security scanning and secrets
Goal: every scanner on, and a password never enters the repository. Owner: security lead. Time: 45 minutes.
4.1 Repository-level scanning
enterprise/governance/apply.sh --org <org> --scope repo
Turns on secret scanning, push protection, non-provider patterns, validity checks, and private vulnerability reporting.
On private repositories these need Secret Protection and Code Security. The API returns 200 even when the feature is inactive on your plan, so read the response body, do not trust the status code:
gh api repos/<org>/<repo> --jq .security_and_analysis
4.2 Code scanning
security.yml runs CodeQL on every pull request from this repository, on every push to main/dev, and weekly. Fork PRs are analysed post-merge because GitHub does not grant security-events: write to fork workflows — the code_scanning rule in the ruleset still blocks a merge on a high-severity alert.
Alternatively, use default setup (Settings → Code security) and delete the codeql job. Pick one. Running both produces duplicate alerts and confusing counts.
4.3 Dependency updates
.github/dependabot.yml covers all three package roots plus Actions, grouped and weekly. Dependabot alerts alone do not patch anything; the update PRs are the patching mechanism.
gh api repos/<org>/<repo>/vulnerability-alerts -i | head -1 # 204 = on
4.4 Who reviews alerts
The security team, weekly, in a recorded slot. See Day-2 calendar.
Verify:
enterprise/governance/verify.sh --org <org> --repo <org>/archify | sed -n '/Repository settings/,$p'
gh api repos/<org>/<repo>/code-scanning/analyses --jq '.[0] | {tool, created_at}'
Rollback: disable a scanner in the UI. Push protection is the last one to turn off — with agents writing code, it matters more, not less.
Evidence: security_and_analysis output, first CodeQL analysis link, first Dependabot PR.
Phase 5 — Automation and deploys
Goal: lock down what Actions can run and who can ship. Owner: platform lead. Time: 60 minutes.
5.1 Org Actions policy
Org Settings → Actions → General (UI; record a screenshot):
- [ ] Allow GitHub-owned and verified creators, plus actions listed by name
- [ ] Workflow permissions: read-only by default
- [ ] Require approval before workflows run from outside contributors
- [ ] Off: "Allow GitHub Actions to create and approve pull requests"
Confirm the default from the API:
gh api orgs/<org>/actions/permissions/workflow --jq '{default: .default_workflow_permissions, can_approve_prs: .can_approve_pull_request_reviews}'
Every workflow in this repository already declares a top-level permissions: contents: read, so the org default is a second layer, not the only one.
5.2 Environments
enterprise/governance/apply.sh --org <org> --scope repo
| Environment | Protection | Used by |
|---|---|---|
production | platform reviewer, no self-review, tag v* + branch main | release.yml |
cloudflare-pages | platform reviewer, branch main | ci.yml deploy-cloudflare |
github-pages | branch main only | ci.yml deploy-pages |
preview | none (non-production) | preview.yml |
[object Object]
5.3 Secrets and variables
Names and owners are in ../governance/secrets-inventory.yaml. Values are set by hand and never committed.
# Cloudflare (production + preview environments)
gh secret set CLOUDFLARE_API_TOKEN --env cloudflare-pages
gh secret set CLOUDFLARE_API_TOKEN --env preview
gh variable set CLOUDFLARE_PAGES_PROJECT --body archify-site
gh variable set CLOUDFLARE_ACCOUNT_ID --body <32-hex-account-id>
# Governance drift (read-only org administration)
gh secret set GOVERNANCE_TOKEN
gh variable set GOVERNANCE_ORG --body <org>
CLOUDFLARE_PAGES_PROJECT empty means both Cloudflare jobs skip. That is the intended way to run without Cloudflare.
5.4 Required checks
Already applied in Phase 3. If you added or renamed a job, update protect-main.json and re-apply, then run --verify-checks.
5.5 First full run
gh workflow run ci.yml
gh run watch
gh workflow run security.yml
gh run watch
Expect security / action pins to fail until Phase 0.4 is committed.
Verify:
gh api repos/<org>/<repo>/environments --jq '.environments[] | {name, rules: [.protection_rules[].type]}'
gh secret list --env cloudflare-pages
Rollback: an environment with no reviewer is inert, not dangerous — remove the reviewer requirement rather than the environment if a release is stuck, and restore it immediately after.
Evidence: Actions policy screenshot, environment list with protection rules, secret names (never values), first green ci.yml and security.yml run links.
Phase 6 — AI agents
Goal: agents get their own identity, the smallest access that works, and no power to merge. Owner: AI lead. Time: 45 minutes, then a one-month pilot.
6.1 Enterprise AI controls (Enterprise Cloud)
Enterprise Settings → AI controls:
- [ ] Agents: enable the approved agents for the pilot org/repos only
- [ ] MCP: allow only approved tool servers — the agent firewall does not cover MCP, so this list is the control
- [ ] Copilot: restrict allowed models, for cost and compliance
- [ ] Delegate AI policy work to the AI lead with a fine-grained role
6.2 Guardrails
- [ ] Copilot → Cloud agent → Internet access: firewall on, recommended allowlist, repository custom rules disabled
- [ ] Agent pull requests require workflow approval (Phase 5.1)
- [ ] Agents are not on any ruleset bypass list
- [ ] Agents hold no production secret and no deploy right
6.3 Register before installing
Add the entry to ../governance/agent-register.yaml first: name, human owner, repos, permissions, approval date, review date. Then follow agent-governance.md to create the app and install it on selected repositories only.
6.4 Approved custom agents
Define them once in a .github-private repository, and add a ruleset so only org-admins can change files under agents/ and .github/agents/.
Verify:
gh api orgs/<org>/installations --jq '.[] | {app: .app_slug, selection: .repository_selection}'
gh api orgs/<org>/teams/ai-agents/repos/<org>/<repo> --jq .permission # write, never admin
Rollback: uninstall the app (gh api -X DELETE orgs/<org>/installations/<id>). That revokes every token it holds, immediately. Update the register in the same change.
Evidence: AI controls screenshots, installation list, register entry, one agent-authored pull request that required a human approval to merge.
Phase 7 — Oversight and spending
Goal: answer "who or what changed this, and what did it cost" at any time. Owner: engineering lead + security lead. Time: 30 minutes, then recurring.
7.1 Spending limits
Billing → spending limits: set a cap for Actions, Copilot and each paid security product. Agents burn usage fast; a cap converts an incident into a notification.
7.2 Audit log
- [ ] Review monthly: Org Settings → Logs → Audit log
- [ ] On Enterprise Cloud, stream it to long-term storage
The audit log UI is included in Team. The audit log API is not: gh api orgs/<org>/audit-log returns 404 on Team and needs Enterprise. Review in the UI, and export by hand if a record is needed:
# Enterprise only — expect 404 on Team
gh api "orgs/<org>/audit-log?per_page=100&phrase=action:repo.change_merge_setting" --jq '.[] | {actor, action, created_at}'
7.3 Drift
governance.yml runs verify.sh daily and on any change under enterprise/governance/. A red run is a real finding, not noise: either the live state drifted or the desired state in this repository is stale.
7.4 Recurring reviews
See Day-2 calendar.
Evidence: spending-limit screenshot, first monthly audit review entry, first green governance / drift run.
Phase 8 — Company login (later)
Do this when the company adopts Google Workspace, Microsoft Entra or Okta, and the org is on Enterprise Cloud.
- [ ] Connect SAML SSO so access depends on the company login
- [ ] Turn on SCIM so joiners and leavers are handled automatically
- [ ] Decide on Enterprise Managed Users before the team grows — switching later means migrating accounts
Until then, personal GitHub accounts with mandatory 2FA are acceptable. Record the decision and its date so it does not silently become permanent.
Routine operations
Cut a release
- Prepare the version. Bump
archify/package.jsonandarchify/skill-release.json; updateCHANGELOG.md; rebuild the archive.
``sh scripts/build-zip.sh archify.zip npm run test:full ``
- Land it through the normal path. Pull request to
dev, then a promotion PRdev → mainthat records the tested revision, the real-task evidence, and any unresolved issue. CI is not trial-use acceptance.
- Tag. Stable releases need an annotated tag, and the tag must match
archify/package.json:
``sh git tag -a v3.3.0 -m "archify 3.3.0" git push origin v3.3.0 ``
- Approve the production gate.
release.ymlwaits on theproductionenvironment. A platform reviewer — not the person who pushed the tag — approves:
``sh gh run list --workflow release.yml --limit 1 gh api repos/<org>/<repo>/actions/runs/<run_id>/pending_deployments \ --jq '.[] | {environment: .environment.name, id}' gh api -X POST repos/<org>/<repo>/actions/runs/<run_id>/pending_deployments \ -F environment_ids[]=<environment_id> -f state=approved -f comment="Release v3.3.0 approved" ``
The job then re-runs the full suite, checks the archive is deterministic, and publishes the Release with archify.zip attached.
- Publish the update manifest in a follow-up commit.
stable.jsonmust point at the Release that now exists. Thepublished-update-manifestgate verifies the asset, the tagged archive and the digest before the site deploys — that is why the manifest is a separate commit and not part of the tag.
- Confirm provenance.
provenance.ymlruns onrelease: publishedand attachesSHA256SUMS.txtand a CycloneDX SBOM:
``sh gh release view v3.3.0 --json assets --jq '.assets[].name' gh attestation verify archify.zip --repo <org>/archify ``
- Public acceptance. Install from the advertised path in an isolated environment and confirm the version users actually get. Only then is the channel complete.
Deploy the website
Automatic. A push to main deploys GitHub Pages after every required gate, and Cloudflare Pages if CLOUDFLARE_PAGES_PROJECT is set. Both jobs re-check that main still points at the commit they built, and skip themselves as obsolete if it does not.
gh run list --workflow ci.yml --branch main --limit 3
gh api repos/<org>/<repo>/deployments --jq '.[0:5][] | {environment, ref, created_at}'
Preview a website change
Automatic for a same-repo pull request touching website/**. The URL is posted as a comment marked <!-- archify-preview -->, updated in place on each push. Fork PRs are skipped by design.
Hotfix
A production defect does not change the rules; it changes the urgency.
- Branch from
main, fix, open a pull request. - One approval is still required. The bypass list is for emergencies only and using it requires a written record in the incident.
- Tag a patch release and follow Cut a release from step 3.
Rollback
Roll back a release
Tags are immutable, so a bad release is superseded, never rewritten.
| Symptom | Action |
|---|---|
| Broken install for users | Publish a patch release with the fix. This is the only path that reaches users who already updated. |
| Release published by mistake | gh release edit v3.3.0 --prerelease (removes it from "latest"), then publish the correct version. |
| Notifier offering a bad version | Revert the stable.json commit on main. The gated deploy re-verifies and republishes the site; the notifier stops offering it after that deploy. |
| Provenance or asset mismatch | Treat as an incident, not a rollback: the published bytes do not match the tag. See Incident response. |
Roll back the website
git revert <commit>onmainthrough a pull request (the ruleset still applies).- The merge triggers a fresh deploy of the reverted build.
- Confirm the live page and the deployment record.
Re-running an old successful deploy run does not work: the obsolete-run guard compares main HEAD with the run's SHA and skips itself. That guard exists so a stale build cannot overwrite a newer one. Use a revert.
Roll back a configuration change
git checkout <previous-commit> -- enterprise/governance/
enterprise/governance/apply.sh --org <org> --dry-run
enterprise/governance/apply.sh --org <org>
Configuration is data. Rolling it back is a diff and a re-apply, not a UI archaeology exercise.
Incident response
| Severity | Example | Response |
|---|---|---|
| SEV1 | Published archive does not match its tag; a secret was pushed; an agent merged code | Contain within 15 minutes, notify owners, rotate credentials |
| SEV2 | Required check permanently red; deploy blocked; drift persists after re-apply | Fix within a business day |
| SEV3 | A single scanner noisy; a docs build flaky | Next scheduled review |
Contain
# Stop all workflows in the repository.
gh api -X PUT repos/<org>/<repo>/actions/permissions -F enabled=false
# Revoke a leaked token or a compromised agent.
gh api -X DELETE orgs/<org>/installations/<installation_id>
# Rotate a deploy credential.
gh secret set CLOUDFLARE_API_TOKEN --env cloudflare-pages
Preserve evidence
# Audit log API is Enterprise-only; on Team export from Org Settings → Logs instead.
gh api "orgs/<org>/audit-log?per_page=100" > incident/audit-$(date -u +%Y%m%dT%H%M).json || \
echo 'audit-log API unavailable on this plan: capture the UI export by hand' >&2
gh run list --limit 50 --json databaseId,workflowName,conclusion,headSha,createdAt > incident/runs.json
gh release view <tag> --json assets,createdAt > incident/release.json
Do not delete a bad release or a workflow run before this is captured. Deleting the evidence is how a small problem becomes an unattributable one.
Recover
- Rotate every credential the actor could read. Rotate first, investigate second.
- Fix forward through the normal pull-request path.
- Re-enable Actions only after the fix is merged.
- Write the record: timeline, root cause, the control that should have caught it, and the change to
enterprise/governance/that closes it. If no file changes, the incident is not closed.
Day-2 calendar
| Cadence | Task | Owner | Where |
|---|---|---|---|
| Daily | governance / drift result | platform | Actions |
| Weekly | Alert triage: CodeQL, secret scanning, Dependabot | security | Security tab |
| Weekly | Dependabot PRs reviewed and merged | platform | Pull requests |
| Monthly | Audit log review | security | Org Settings → Logs |
| Monthly | Spend against limits | eng lead | Billing |
| Quarterly | Team membership review | security | gh api orgs/<org>/teams/<slug>/members |
| Quarterly | Agent register review; remove unused apps | AI lead | agent-register.yaml |
| Quarterly | Ruleset review: approvals, contexts, bypass list | platform | rulesets/*.json |
| Per release | Release checklist and public acceptance | platform | CONTRIBUTING.md |
Offboarding a person
Same day, in this order:
gh api -X DELETE orgs/<org>/members/<login>- Remove from every team; confirm no direct repository collaborator remains
- Revoke personal access tokens and SSH keys
- Rotate every shared secret they could read (
secrets-inventory.yamlsays which) - Transfer ownership of any app, environment or release they owned
- Record the date in the access review log
Step 4 is the one that gets skipped. A leaver who could read CLOUDFLARE_API_TOKEN is a reason to rotate it, not a reason to hope.
When a gate is red
| Check | Likely cause | Action |
|---|---|---|
security / action pins | A PIN-TODO marker is still in a workflow | enterprise/governance/pin-actions.sh, commit, re-run |
scope | The diff cannot be classified | Check scripts/ci-scope.mjs; full coverage is the safe default, so investigate rather than widen |
zip-freshness | archify.zip is stale | scripts/build-zip.sh archify.zip, commit the result |
published-update-manifest | stable.json points at a version with no Release, or a mismatched asset | Publish the Release first; the manifest is a follow-up commit |
test (18/20/24) | A runtime-specific API was used | Fix the code; do not drop a runtime from the matrix |
Windows test portability | A path assumption that only holds on POSIX | Use the portable path helpers under archify/renderers/shared/ |
security / codeql | A genuine finding, or a fork PR | Fork PRs are expected to skip; a same-repo finding is a real alert |
governance / drift | Live state changed outside this repository, or desired state is stale | verify.sh names the field; decide which side is right, then fix that side |
| Release job waiting | production environment approval | A platform reviewer approves; the tag pusher cannot self-approve |
Appendix A — Command reference
# Apply and verify
enterprise/governance/apply.sh --org <org> --repo <org>/archify --dry-run
enterprise/governance/apply.sh --org <org> --repo <org>/archify
enterprise/governance/verify.sh --org <org> --repo <org>/archify --report drift.md
enterprise/governance/pin-actions.sh
# Access
gh api orgs/<org>/members?role=admin --jq '.[].login'
gh api orgs/<org>/teams --jq '.[].slug'
gh api orgs/<org>/teams/ai-agents/members --jq 'length'
# Protection
gh api orgs/<org>/rulesets --jq '.[] | {name, target, enforcement}'
gh api orgs/<org>/rulesets/<id> --jq '.rules[].type'
gh api repos/<org>/<repo>/environments --jq '.environments[].name'
# Scanning
gh api repos/<org>/<repo> --jq .security_and_analysis
gh api repos/<org>/<repo>/code-scanning/analyses --jq '.[0]'
# Release
gh run list --workflow release.yml --limit 5
gh release view <tag> --json assets --jq '.assets[].name'
gh attestation verify archify.zip --repo <org>/archify
Appendix B — Phase record template
## Phase <n> — <name>
Date: <YYYY-MM-DD>
Operator: <name>
Plan: Free | Team | Enterprise Cloud
Applied by: apply.sh <scope> | UI | both
Verify output: <link or inline>
Evidence: <links, screenshots, run ids>
Deviations: <what was skipped and why, with owner and follow-up>
Rollback tested: yes | no
A phase with an empty Deviations line is either genuinely complete or unexamined. Say which.
Appendix C — Decision log
Record decisions that will otherwise be relitigated:
| Decision | Date | Owner | Rationale |
|---|---|---|---|
| Auto-merge disabled repository-wide | 2026-11-03 | platform | No unattended merge path for a bot or agent |
| CodeQL required via ruleset rule, not a required check | 2026-11-03 | security | Fork PRs cannot upload results; the rule blocks regardless of author |
1 approval on archify, 2 on payment/auth/infra repos | 2026-11-03 | eng lead | Single-maintainer repository; revisit when the team grows |
| Personal accounts + 2FA until an IdP exists | 2026-11-03 | eng lead | No company login system yet; EMU decided before the team grows |
| Preview deployments hold the Cloudflare token | 2026-11-03 | platform | Environment separation prevents fork access; revisit at 5+ contributors |