Zyeta Enterprise operations

Security control matrix

One row per control, with where it is enforced and how to prove it is still enforced. Phase numbers refer to the organization setup phases in deployment-runbook.md.

The evidence column is meant to be run, not read. If a command cannot produce a result, the control is not in place, whatever the settings page suggests.

[object Object]

Access and identity

IDControlPhaseEnforced byEvidenceOwner
AC-12FA required for every member1org.json → two_factor_requirement_enabledgh api orgs/<org> --jq .two_factor_requirement_enabledsecurity
AC-2Two or three owners, named0teams.yaml → ownersgh api orgs/<org>/members?role=admin --jq '.[].login'eng lead
AC-3No default repository permission1org.json → default_repository_permission: nonegh api orgs/<org> --jq .default_repository_permissionsecurity
AC-4Access flows through teams only2teams.yaml, applied by apply.shgh api orgs/<org>/teams/<slug>/repos/<org>/<repo> --jq .permissionplatform
AC-5Agents have their own identity, never a person6agent-register.yaml, GitHub App installation on selected reposgh api orgs/<org>/installations --jq '.[].app_slug'ai lead
AC-6Agents hold write, never admin or maintain6teams.yaml (ai-agents: write)gh api orgs/<org>/teams/ai-agents/repos/<org>/<repo> --jq .permissionsecurity
AC-7Leavers removed the day they leave7Runbook offboarding checklistgh api orgs/<org>/members --jq '.[].login' against the rostersecurity
AC-8Company login (SSO/SCIM)8Enterprise Cloud + IdPgh api orgs/<org> --jq .saml_sso_enabled — false until Phase 8eng lead

Branch and release integrity

IDControlPhaseEnforced byEvidenceOwner
BR-1No direct push to the default branch3rulesets/protect-main.json (pull_request rule)gh api orgs/<org>/rulesets --jq '.[].name'platform
BR-2One human approval, stale approvals dismissed3required_approving_review_count: 1, dismiss_stale_reviews_on_pushgh api orgs/<org>/rulesets/<id> --jq '.rules[] \| select(.type=="pull_request")'platform
BR-3Last push approved by someone else3require_last_push_approval: truesame as BR-2platform
BR-4Code Owners must approve owned paths3require_code_owner_review + .github/CODEOWNERSgh api repos/<org>/<repo>/contents/.github/CODEOWNERS --jq .patheng lead
BR-5Deletions and force pushes blocked3deletion, non_fast_forward rulesgh api orgs/<org>/rulesets/<id> --jq '[.rules[].type]'platform
BR-6Bypass list is OrganizationAdmin only3bypass_actors in both rulesetsgh api orgs/<org>/rulesets/<id> --jq '.bypass_actors'security
BR-7Release tags immutable3rulesets/protect-release-tags.jsongh api orgs/<org>/rulesets --jq '.[] \| select(.target=="tag")'platform
BR-8Stable releases use annotated tags5release.yml "Stable release tag must be annotated"Run log for the release workflowplatform
BR-9Auto-merge disabled3repository.json → allow_auto_merge: falsegh api repos/<org>/<repo> --jq .allow_auto_mergeplatform

Code and dependency scanning

IDControlPhaseEnforced byEvidenceOwner
SC-1CodeQL on every PR and weekly4security.yml job security / codeqlgh api repos/<org>/<repo>/code-scanning/analyses --jq '.[0]'security
SC-2High-severity alerts block merge3, 4code_scanning rule in protect-main.jsongh api orgs/<org>/rulesets/<id> --jq '.rules[] \| select(.type=="code_scanning")'security
SC-3Dependabot alerts and security updates4org.json defaults + .github/dependabot.ymlgh api repos/<org>/<repo>/vulnerability-alerts -i → 204security
SC-4Dependency review on every PR4security.yml job security / dependency reviewPR check run named security / dependency reviewsecurity
SC-5SBOM per package root, attached to releases4security.yml job security / sbom, provenance.ymlgh release view <tag> --json assetsplatform
SC-6Shipped skill has zero runtime dependencies4security.yml "Shipped skill must declare no runtime dependencies"node -p "Object.keys(require('./archify/package.json').dependencies||{})"platform
SC-7Actions pinned to commit SHAs5test/workflow-action-pinning.test.mjs, security / action pinsnode --test test/workflow-action-pinning.test.mjsplatform
SC-8Release provenance is verifiable (public repos; Team)5provenance.yml → actions/attest-build-provenancegh attestation verify archify.zip --repo <org>/archifyplatform

Secrets

IDControlPhaseEnforced byEvidenceOwner
SE-1Secret scanning on private repos4repository.json → secret_scanninggh api repos/<org>/<repo> --jq .security_and_analysis.secret_scanning.statussecurity
SE-2Push protection blocks a secret before it lands4repository.json → secret_scanning_push_protectiongh api repos/<org>/<repo> --jq .security_and_analysis.secret_scanning_push_protection.statussecurity
SE-3Non-provider patterns and validity checks4secret_scanning_non_provider_patterns, secret_scanning_validity_checkssame endpointsecurity
SE-4Production secrets only on a protected environment5environments/cloudflare-pages.jsongh api repos/<org>/<repo>/environments --jq '.environments[].name'platform
SE-5Secret inventory with owners and rotation5secrets-inventory.yamlgrep -c 'name:' enterprise/governance/secrets-inventory.yamlsecurity
SE-6Private vulnerability reporting open4repository.json → private_vulnerability_reportinggh api repos/<org>/<repo>/private-vulnerability-reporting --jq .enabledsecurity

CI/CD execution

IDControlPhaseEnforced byEvidenceOwner
CI-1Default token is read-only5top-level permissions: contents: read in every workflowgrep -n 'permissions:' .github/workflows/*.ymlplatform
CI-2Actions limited to GitHub-verified creators + named5Org Settings → Actions → General (UI, Phase 5)Screenshot in the phase record; gh api orgs/<org>/actions/permissionsplatform
CI-3No workflow can create or approve PRs5Org Settings → Actions → General (UI)gh api orgs/<org>/actions/permissions/workflow --jq .default_workflow_permissionsplatform
CI-4Outside contributors need approval to run workflows5Org Settings → Actions → General (UI)gh api repos/<org>/<repo>/actions/permissions/fork-pr-contributor-approvalplatform
CI-5Production release waits for a human (public repos on Team)5environment: production in release.ymlgh api repos/<org>/<repo>/environments/production --jq '.protection_rules'platform
CI-6No deploy from a pull request5if: guards on deploy-pages, deploy-cloudflaregrep -n "refs/heads/main" .github/workflows/ci.ymlplatform
CI-7Privileged pull_request_target never runs PR code5contributor-cards.yml checks out the default branchRun log for the card workflowplatform

Oversight

IDControlPhaseEnforced byEvidenceOwner
OV-1Configuration drift detected daily7governance.yml + verify.shLatest governance / drift runplatform
OV-2Alerts reviewed weekly4, 7Rota, recorded in the review logReview log entry per weeksecurity
OV-3Agent register reviewed quarterly7agent-register.yaml → review_duegrep review_due enterprise/governance/agent-register.yamlai lead
OV-4Spend limits on Actions, Copilot, security products7Billing → spending limits (UI)Screenshot in the phase recordeng lead
OV-5Audit log reviewed monthly (UI on Team; API needs Enterprise)7Org Settings → LogsMonthly review entrysecurity
OV-6Team membership reviewed quarterly7Roster vs gh api orgs/<org>/teams/<slug>/membersReview log entrysecurity

Residual risks

Recorded because pretending they are closed is worse than naming them.

RiskWhy it remainsMitigationAccepted by
A contributor with write can push to a non-default branch, including one a workflow trusts by name.Branch protection covers the default branch; other branches are working space.No workflow deploys or publishes from a non-default branch. Deploy jobs check refs/heads/main.platform
Fork PRs do not get CodeQL results.GitHub does not grant security-events: write to fork workflows.Post-merge analysis on main plus the code_scanning ruleset rule; the aggregate test (22) gate still runs on forks.security
Secret scanning on private repositories needs a paid product.Plan limit, not a configuration mistake.verify.sh reports the status; the runbook records the plan decision. Public repositories get it free.eng lead
An agent's pull request can contain prompt-injected content from an issue it read.Agent behaviour is not fully deterministic.Agents never merge, never hold production secrets, and workflows triggered by their PRs need approval.ai lead
The Cloudflare token is shared by production and preview.One project, one token scope.Separated by environment so a fork PR cannot read it; rotation is 90 days.platform
governance.yml cannot read org settings without a long-lived token.GITHUB_TOKEN is repository-scoped.Read-only token, 90-day rotation, prefer a GitHub App installation token.security
archify.zip is committed to the repository.It is the install artifact for agents that cannot run a build.zip-freshness proves it is the deterministic build; provenance.yml attests the published bytes against the tagged blob.platform

Evidence collection

For a review, a release, or an audit, collect one file:

{
  echo "# Control evidence $(date -u +%FT%TZ)"
  echo
  echo '## Drift'
  enterprise/governance/verify.sh --org <org> --repo <org>/archify
  echo
  echo '## Rulesets'
  gh api orgs/<org>/rulesets --jq '.[] | {name, target, enforcement}'
  echo
  echo '## Environments'
  gh api repos/<org>/<repo>/environments --jq '.environments[] | {name, protection_rules}'
  echo
  echo '## Scanning'
  gh api repos/<org>/<repo> --jq .security_and_analysis
  echo
  echo '## Latest release provenance'
  gh release view --json tagName,assets --jq '{tagName, assets: [.assets[].name]}'
} > "evidence/controls-$(date -u +%Y%m%d).md"

Store it with the release record. A control with no evidence line is open, even if this table says otherwise.